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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW* 
In the opinion of appellant/ the following issues are 
presented: 
1. Whether the convictions for theft by embezzlement must 
be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to support 
prosecution on that basis and prosecution for theft by deception 
was barred by the statute of limitations. 
2. Whether the convictions must be reversed in this case 
because it is impossible to tell whether the jury found appellant 
guilty for offenses that were clearly barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's 
motion for a new trial when appellant's new counsel did not have 
time to prepare an adequate record and the Court did not hold a 
evidentiary hearing on appellantfs motion. 
4. Whether the monetary portion of the sentence was illegal 
because the Court imposed a fine and restitution on appellant/ 
when he had no financial ability to pay them, and it ordered 
restitution for persons not named as victims in the information. 
* 
This case has not previously been before this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In an information filed on September 10, 1984, appellant was 
charged with nine counts of theft in violation of Utah Code Ann, 
§§76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1953). At a jury trial held on 
September 17 through 24, 1984, before the Honorable George E. 
Balliff appellant was found guilty on eight counts, and one count 
(count 9) was dismissed at the close of all the evidence. 
On October 26, 1984, the Court sentenced appellant to a term 
of imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 15 years on 
each count, said counts to run concurrently with each other. 
Appellant was also ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00 on each 
count and was further ordered to make restitution not to exceed 
$500,000.00 to the individuals who invested money in his project. 
The restitution amount was to be determined either (a) by 
agreement between the defendant and the Division of Corrections/ 
(b) as determined through civil litigationf or (c) by further 
order of the court. 
On November 5f 1984, appellant, though new counsel, filed a 
motion for new trial and a motion for additional time to submit a 
memorandum and procure the necessary evidence in support of his 
motion. The motion for new trial was denied by an order and 
decision of the Court dated February 8, 1985. A notice of appeal 
was filed on February 15, 1985. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the late summer of 1979, appellant pre-sold 
condominiums to be built on property he had recently acquired in 
Provo, Utah. At trial/ the buyers claimed that appellant told 
them he would put their money in trust and use it only in the 
project. Appellant did not hold the buyers' money in trust 
pending construction, but immediately deposited their money in 
his general real estate operating account. Some of the buyers1 
money was used on the projectf while most of it was used on 
appellant's unrelated ventures. 
Testifying in his own defense, appellant acknowledged that 
he did not put the money in trust, nor did he ever intend to do 
so. Rather, appellant believed he was permitted to keep the 
buyers' money upon receipt/ and use it for any purpose, because 
the earnest money agreements expressly stated the money was 
non-refundable. The project failed when appellant was unable to 
obtain construction financing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Government's Case. 
In late July 1979, appellant and Sunwest II Development 
Corporation entered into an agreement to purchase jointly from 
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Martensen Real Estate a parcel of undeveloped land known as the 
Temple Hills property in Provo, Utah (Tr. 25.). In order to 
raise capital/ appellant pre-sold condominiums that he planned to 
2 
build on the property to a number of buyers (Tr. 27-28). 
The date of investment by each person named in the 
information/ the amount invested and the date appellant deposited 
their funds into his own checking account are as follows: 
Count 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
Investor 
Yalden 
Jolley 
Smith 
Smith 
Smith 
Smith 
Barlow 
Pace 
Amount Invested Date of 
Investment 
$7,333.33 11-6-79 
$30,000.00 8-27-79 
8-31-79 
} $33,000.00(total) 8-31-79 
8-31-79 
$5,333.33 11-6-79 
$22,000.00 9-5-79 
$11,000.00 8-31-79 
Date deposited 
into Appellant's 
checking account 
12-18-79 
8-31-79 
} 9-4-79 
12-18-79 
9-10-79 
9-4-79 
See Second Amended Information; Exhibits 79 47 , 73. 
"Tr." refers to the three volumes of transcript/ successively 
paginated/ which contain most of the trial proceedings. "P. Tr.n 
refers to a partial transcript of trial containing most of the 
testimony of two witnesses/ i.e.f Rod Bullock and G. David Smith. 
"N. Tr." refers to the separate volume of transcript containing 
the motion for new trial. "S. Tr." refers to the separate volume 
of transcript containing the sentencing hearing. 
2 
A total of 29 units were pre-sold by appellant or his 
representatives for the Temple Hills Condominium Project between 
August 21/ 1979/ and April 30, 1981. See Exhibit 7. 
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Upon receipt of the buyers1 moneyf appellant did not place 
their money in trust, but almost immediately deposited the funds 
into his general real estate operating account with other 
unrelated monies over which he had sole control (Tr. 28-29). Two 
witnesses from the Department of Business Regulations testified 
that appellant acted improperly under State law by not 
immediately placing the buyers1 money in a trust account (Tr. 1, 
11-15, 831-833, 838-840). 
While certain expenditures were made for the Temple Hills 
project from appellant's checking account, other expenditures 
unrelated to Temple Hills were also made from those accounts. 
Both witnesses from the Department of Business Regulations 
testified that the trust account requirement precluded appellant 
from spending the buyers' funds on matters other than Temple 
Hills (Tr. 12, 831). By April 29, 1980, virtually all of the 
money given to appellant had been spent by him. None of the 
buyers received their investment back in the Temple Hills project 
(Tr. 28-29). The background of these events is detailed below. 
Before selling any condominium units, Michael Crockett, an 
experienced real estate developer and principal in Sunwest II, 
suggested to appellant that the Earnest Money Agreements should 
contain a non-refundability clause for the buyers down payment in 
order to provide the developers with some freedom to use the 
money (Tr. 30, 46-47, 60-61, 66, 71, 86) .3 Despite the 
Crockett was not charged with any criminal offense. 
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non-refundability clausef Crockett said he believed the buyers1 
money needed to be held in trust or escrow. He also testified 
that he did not know their money was being used by appellant for 
4 
non-Temple Hills purposes (Tr. 48-49, 66, 93-94). After 
appellant acquired an interest in the landf he retained Rod 
Bullock, a real estate agent for Martensen Real Estate which had 
sold appellant the property, as the exclusive listing agent for 
future condominium sales (Tr. 99). In order to raise capital, it 
was decided to offer a number of buyers an investment inducement 
in the form of a discount off the purchase price of a condominium 
equal to the actual amount of money they invested (Tr. 103). 
In return for their discount, Bullock understood that the 
buyers1 money was non-refundable. Bullock maintained, however, 
that prior to any purchase appellant expressly told him and 
several buyers, including the Barlows and Jolleys, that their 
money would be held in a trust account, and would be used as 
needed only in the Temple Hills project (Tr. Ill; P. Tr. 7-8, 10, 
13, 15-16, 22). 
Six of the eight counts in the information related to 
purchases made by, or through, David Smith, a licensed real 
estate agent. Mr. Smith invested approximately $38,000.00 of his 
On cross examination, Crockett waivered on these points. For 
example, he conceded that he personally received some of the 
buyers1 money as a consultants fee, and was aware that appellant 
used at least some buyer money on other unrelated projects (Tr. 
88, 90). The unrelated expenditures were permissible, according 
to Crockett, to strengthen appellant's financial qualifications 
for funding the Temple Hills Project (Tr. 91-92). 
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own in the project (P. Tr. 34-44.) While Smith knew that his 
down payments were non-refundablef he said that appellant told 
him before investing that the money would be placed in trust and 
used exclusively in the project (P. Tr. 41-56)• 
Mr. Smith also brought Jack Yalden and Heber Pace into the 
project (Tr. 121-122, 143-149). Mr. Yalden invested based upon 
appellant's representation to him that the money would be held in 
trust and used only for Temple Hills (Tr. 121-124) . Mr. Pace 
also understood from discussions with appellant and Smith that 
his money would be held in trust and used only in the Temple 
Hills project (Tr. 146-149). 
Like the other buyers, Joel Barlow and J. Arben Jolley also 
purchased units based on appellant's alleged representations, 
prior to purchasing, that their money would be placed in trust 
and used solely on Temple Hills (Tr. 161-164, 171f 178-182). 
Three other buyers not named in the Second Amended 
Information also testified on a restricted basis concerning their 
5 
purchases. According to these individuals/ appellant-
represented to them prior to purchasing that their money would be 
held in trust and/or used solely on the Temple Hills project (Tr. 
198, 203-208, 265, 267-270, 281, 284-287). 
The individuals were Martha Browning, Norman Carlson and Sara 
Yates. Pursuant to court order, these buyers were not permitted 
to testify with the same breadth as those named in the 
information to avoid prejudice to the defendant from evidence of 
alleged other crimes for which he was not charged (Tr. 255-263). 
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After the buyers made their investments, appellant obtained 
a loan in the fall of 1980 for $400,000.00 from FMA Finance which 
was secured by the Temple Hills Property. The majority of the 
loan ($300,000.00) was used to pay off the land while about 
$100r000.00 was deposited into appellant's operating account and 
was used for some of his other business ventures (Tr. 26-27) . 
Appellant also used some of the buyers' money for his other 
projects including a shopping mall and mining venture (Tr. 
305-306, 317-324, 344-347f 391-394f 428-442). 
After appellant obtained the FMA loanf he tried to secure 
construction financing from a number of lenders including 
Citizens Bank. Negotiations continued during 1981 and 1982. The 
efforts ultimately failed because Citizens' officers did not feel 
he had met their loan commitment conditions (Tr. 445-454; 
Exhibits 43 and 45). 
After Citizens turned appellant down, he defaulted on the 
FMA loan in March 1982 and the property was sold (Tr. 27, 454). 
By April 29, 1980, appellant had essentially spent all of the 
buyers' money (Tr. 505-507). 
The property was sold to a group of investors headed by David 
Smith (Tr. 462-463). The Smith group eventually forced appellant 
into involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 11. (P. Tr. 53). 
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To support this conclusion, an investigator with the Utah 
County Attorney's Office, analyzed appellant's checking accounts 
from August 1979 through selected periods in 1980 (Tr. 500-503; 
Exhibit 47 and 48). This analysis was largely undisputed and, in 
fact, appellant's own analysis showed essentially the same thing. 
See Exhibit 73. 
B. The Defense Evidence. 
Appellantfs defense focused on his belief that, based on the 
non-refundability clause in the Earnest Money Agreements, he 
could fully use the buyers' money as his own upon receipt. 
Appellant maintained that he never concealed his intent to do so. 
To demonstrate that pointf Harold Paulos said that he received 
approximately $2f000.00 a month as consulting fees which he knew 
came from buyer funds. He also knew that buyer money was being 
spent by appellant on other projects in order to strengthen his 
financial qualifications for construction funding (Tr. 522-529, 
551, 555). Mr. Paulos testified that appellant worked tirelessly 
on the project even though at one point appellant thought he 
would receive nothing out of his continued involvement (Tr. 
617-619). 
Chad Bauer was a real estate salesman in 1980 who had 
numerous discussions with appellant about the Temple Hills 
project (Tr. 628f 630-631). According to Mr. Bauer, appellant 
never waivered in his openly expressed belief that he could use 
the buyers' money for unrelated purposes from the moment they 
gave their money to him (Tr. 631-638) . 
Appellant testified in his own defense. After several years 
as a real estate broker, appellant decided to enter the real 
estate development field (Tr. 666-667). His first project was 
Temple Hills which was brought to him in May 1979 by Michael 
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Crockett and Rod Bullock (Tr. 668-674). At the time he acquired 
the land from Martensen Real Estate, he was told that it had 
already been accepted by Provo for a 50-unit condominium project. 
He later learned that the approval was not final (Tr. 679-686) . 
After considerable problems and delays, appellant obtained final 
city approval in February 1980. He renegotiated the payoff 
amount on his contract with Martensen because of the 
unanticipated difficulties with the City (Tr. 686-687). 
As a real estate broker, appellant was familiar with the 
requirements for real estate trust accounts. Appellant readily 
admitted that he did not, and never intended tof put the buyers1 
money in a trust account. Appellant explained that he believed 
the non-refundability clause in paragraph 1 of the Earnest Money 
Agreements made the normal trust requirements inapplicable. For 
that reason he never told anyone that his money would be placed 
in trust. Similarly/ at no time did appellant ever intend to 
spend the money only on Temple Hills and, thus, never told the 
buyers anything to the contrary (Tr. 737-742, 775-781). 
Appellant emphasized that one of the main purposes of the 
Appellant said that Jack Yalden did not ask any questions in 
his brief meeting since Yalden was brought there by Smith who 
already knew how the project would work (Tr. 748-749). Moreover, 
appellant distinctly recalled telling Mrs. Browning that the 
money would be spent and not held in trust. He indicated that he 
assumed Barlow knew the same. Appellant said he never even met 
Mr. Pace and never told Mr. Yates that the money would only be 
spent on Temple Hills (Tr. 755-761). 
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pre-sell program was to strengthen his financial portfolio and 
increase his net worth so he could qualify for construction 
Q 
financing on the development (Tr. 728-730, 747). 
C. Motion for New Trial 
Appellant, through new counsel, filed a motion for new trial 
and a motion for additional time to prepare for a hearing on the 
new trial. (See Motion for New Trial; Motion for Additional Time 
to Submit Memorandum, at pp. 197-201 of the record on appeal.) 
On January 11, 1985, the Court held a hearing on the motion. At 
the hearing, appellant's new counsel indicated that more time was 
needed to obtain the trial transcript and gather evidence for the 
Court to assess fully the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in 
not presenting certain facts at trial. Although the Court did 
not have a specific factual record concerning trial counsel's 
Appellant felt that he had a firm loan commitment by the end of 
1981 from Citizens Bank. He indicated verbal approval was given 
on September 15, 1981, and recalled that he and Mr* Paulos were 
elated over finally obtaining a construction loan (Tr. 693-698). 
He distinctly recalled a meeting with Cleo Hanson of Citizens 
Bank in March of 1982 to finalize satisfying the loan conditions. 
In appellant's view, the only condition that posed a problem at 
the time was delivery of a title insurance policy on the land 
because a lis pendens had been filed by the Smith investor group 
tying up the property. This group would not release its hold and 
eventually took over the property (Tr. 700-705). 
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purported ineffectiveness, it ruled generally that trial 
counsel's failure to present evidence of which he was aware fell 
within the scope of trial strategy which was not a basis for a 
new trial (N. Tr. 5) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Argument 1: There is no evidence to support appellant's 
conviction for theft under the government's sole prosecutorial 
theory of embezzlement* In the light most favorable to the 
government, the offense was committed, if at allf when the buyers 
parted with their money based on the claimed false 
representations by appellant. The latest possible date on which 
appellant could have spent the money he had received earlier is 
irrelevant. Subsequent use of money which has been fraudulently 
obtained is not an essential element of the offense, just as 
non-use is no defense. The government chose to proceed solely on 
an embezzlement theory with no evidentiary support in an effort 
to expand the time frame of the offense because it recognized 
that the only alternative basis for prosecutionf theft by 
deception/ was time-barred under Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-302. 
Therefore/ the convictions must be reversed. 
Argument 2. In addition to the basis for reversal above, the 
convictions must also be reversed because it is impossible to 
-12-
tell from the verdict when the jury found appellant committed the 
offense, i.e., whether he committed the theft on the first or 
second date alleged in each count of the informationf or sometime 
in between. Normally, the date when an offense is committed is 
not of the essence in an information. That general rule is only 
true, however, if the entire range of dates alleged is within the 
statute of limitations. There is an important exception wheref 
as here, the government alleged/ and the jury may have foundf 
that the offense was committed on a date for which prosecution 
was time-barred. Because it is impossible to tell on which date, 
if any, the jury unanimously found the offense in each count was 
committed, the convictions must be reversed for a new trial. 
Argument 3. The Court erred in denying appellant's motion for a 
new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing on the issue of 
the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In the absence of an 
adequate record, the Court could not exercise its discretion. 
The total failure to exercise discretion constitutes an abuse 
requiring a remand for a full hearing on the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. 
Argument 4. The monetary portion of the sentence was illegal 
because the Court imposed a fine and restitution on appellant 
-13-
even though he had no financial ability to pay them, and ordered 
restitution for persons not named as victims in the information. 
ARGUMENT 
1. There was insufficient evidence to sustain the 
convictions for theft by embezzlement and prosecution 
for theft by deception was barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
(a) There was no evidence for an 
embezzlement conviction. 
On October 7, 1983, appellant was originally charged with 
theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 
76-6-405, and the government advised the Court that it intended 
to prosecute the case at trial on that theory. On September 10, 
1984, only seven days before trial, the government filed a new 
information charging theft in violation of Utah Code Annotated, 
§76-6-404. This information amended each count to allege, for 
the first time, that the theft occurred between a certain date in 
See Appellate Record (A.R.) at 112-115. This "Second Amended 
Information" was filed, as required, pursuant to leave of court 
under Rule 4(d), U. R. Crim. P., which provides in part that the 
court may permit an information "to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced". 
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1979 (when each buyer invested) and April 29f 1980 (when 
appellant had spent all of the money). The government 
abandoned its theft by deception theoryf and indicated that it 
now intended to try the case on an embezzlement theory. A.R. at 
97. 
Despite the government's tactical maneuvering, there was no 
evidence at trial to support an embezzlement prosecution. The 
date of April 29, 1980, added to each count by the September 1984 
information/ was apparently chosen by the government in an effort 
to expand the time frame of the offense by claiming that it was 
not until then that appellant had spent all of the buyers' money 
he had earlier obtained by deception. This date,, however, is 
legally immaterial to establish when the offenses were committed. 
The offense, if any, was committed when the buyers claim 
See A.R. at 74-81, 93. The original information filed in 
Eighth Circuit Court contained five counts which corresponded by 
investor to counts 1-3, 7 and 8 of the Second Amended 
Information, but did not plead a range of offense dates in each 
count. 
Before appellant's initial appearance, another information, 
styled an "Amended Information11, was filed in Eighth Circuit 
Court on October 27, 1983, without leave of court as required 
under Rule 4(d), 0. R. Crim. P. This information alleged theft 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §76-6-404. A.R. at 67-71. 
It added four new counts which corresponded by investor to counts 
4-6 and 9 of the Second Amended Information. Like the first 
information, this information did not include a range of dates 
for offense commission. After a preliminary examination on 
January 18, 1980, in Eighth Circuit Court, two counts of the 
amended information, not at issue here, were struck. On January 
24, 1980, the amended information, as modified at the preliminary 
hearing, was filed in Fourth District Court. A.R. at 67. 
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appellant caused them to invest by falsely representing his 
intent to put their money in trust and use it only on Temple 
Hills. 
There is no evidence that appellant's intent to keep their 
money, whether in good faith or fraudulent, was not formed until 
April 29, 1980. The evidence, in fact, was all to the contrary. 
Every buyer called by the government testified that, at the time 
they invested, appellant represented to them their money would be 
12 held in trust and/or only spent on the Temple Hills project. 
Accepting their testimony, these representations were false, when 
made, causing the buyers to part with their money. This offense 
is, at best, theft by deception under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405. 
It was committed and complete, if at all, when appellant obtained 
the money by deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1983); State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978); State v. 
Taylor, 378 P.2d 352 (Utah 1963); See State v. Saylor, 618 P.2d 
1166 (Kan. 1980) (Kansas statute nearly identical to Utah's). 
As already noted, the government recognized that prosecution 
was time-barred for theft by deception and filed the September 
1984 information alleging theft generally, under Utah Code Ann., 
See testimony of David Smith (P. Tr. 41-56); Jack Yalden (Tr. 
121-124); Heber Pace (Tr. 146-149); Joel Barlow (Tr. 161-164); 
Joseph Barlow (Tr. 178-182); Martha Browning (Tr. 203-208); 
Norman Carlson (Tr. 267-270); and Sara Yates (Tr. 284-287). 
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§76-6-404, in an apparent attempt to expand the time frame of the 
offense by prosecuting the theft on an embezzlement theory. The 
facts, however, simply do not support the government's theory. 
13 Faced with a strategic decision, the government chose to ignore 
the critical distinction made by this Court between theft by 
deception and embezzlement in State v. Taylor, supra; 
Fundamental in the nature of embezzlement is the 
coming into possession of property honestlyf "by virtue 
of one's trust,lf and then converting it to one's own use 
in violation of that trust. This is in contrast to 
situations wheref as here, the essential wrong is 
committed in obtaining possession of the property. 
Where the intent to take the property is formed before 
the taking, and is coupled with some deception or trick 
to acquire possession of the propertyy the crime is not 
embezzlement. One could not embezzle that which he had 
already stolen. Since the State did not prove the 
charge upon which the conviction is grounded/ it is 
reversed. 
378 P. 2d at 354 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). See Moore v. United States, 160 U.S. 268f 269 (1895); 
United States v. Trevino, 491 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(embezzlement and theft are inconsistent since embezzlement 
13 
The government's choice was either to prosecute an offense for 
which there was arguably some evidence, i.e., theft by deception, 
but for which the statute of limitations had clearly run, or, 
alternatively, pursue multiple counts on an embezzlement theory 
of prosecution with no evidentiary support. 
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presupposes lawful/ honest possession while theft does not); 
State v, McCormicky 442 P.2d 134 (Ariz. 1968).14 
The government elected to proceed solely on an embezzlement 
theory without any evidence to support it. It did so because, as 
discussed below, prosecution on the alternative theory of theft 
by deception was clearly time-barred. 
b. The statute of limitation had run on 
theft by deception. 
The appropriate statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann., 
§76-1-302, requires that a felony prosecution must be commenced 
within four years from the time the offense is committed. Thus, 
for investments made in 1979 based on alleged false 
representations, the statute of limitations had clearly run in 
1983 unless the thefts were somehow not committed until 1980. 
While consolidation is not an issue heref it is worth noting 
that in order to avoid the technical pleadings problems presented 
by such cases as Taylor, the Utah legislature adopted 
consolidated theft provisions embracing a number of larceny-type 
common law offenses into a single statutory offense in 1973. See 
Utah Code Annotated/ §76-6-403. Even after statutory 
consolidation/ of coursef the government must still prove that 
the offense was committed in some manner. See State v. Seekford/ 
638 P.2d 525/ 526-27 (Utah 1981); see alsof State v. Saylorf 
supraf 618 P.2d at 1169-1170. Further/ consolidation is 
immaterial when there is no evidence for one of the offenses or 
the statute of limitations has run. For example/ a prosecution 
could proceed on alternative theories of theft o£ receiving 
stolen property if it was not clear whether the defendant 
actually stole or simply received the property/ as long as there 
was some evidence to convict on either theory. Iff however/ the 
statute of limitation had run on the theft/ but not on the later 
receipt/ the government could not mesh the two offenses in order 
to avoid the time bar. In that case, the government would be 
required to prove that the defendant received the property/ not 
stole it/ to avoid the statute of limitations. 
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Whether one accepts the government's theory that appellant made 
misrepresentations when he took the buyers' money, or appellant's 
position that he did not, it is clear that appellant never 
intended to place the buyers' money in trust and always intended 
to use at least some of it on non-Temple Hills projects. Thus, 
appellant's intent to keep the money was formed and complete on 
the date when each buyer invested his money, i.e., on the first 
15 date of each count in the information. 
No theory of theft depends upon whether a defendant actually 
spends or disposes of the money he has stolen or embezzled. In 
fact, the crime is complete when the defendant has the intent to 
keep the money regardless of what, if anything, he does with it 
after the crime. See State v. Lakey, supra; State v. Taylorf 
supra; United States v. Mack, 525 P. Supp. 382 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(money stolen, not embezzled, when defendant received funds with 
previously formed intention of appropriating it to her own use); 
United States v. Goldsmith, 274 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1967) 
(embezzlement complete once owner deprived of ownership); United 
States v. Mosley, 507 P.2d 257 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 420 U.S. 
991 (1974) (wrongfully taking is the touchstone of embezzlement, 
not further disposition); United States v. Powell, 294 F. Supp. 
The latest date on which even embezzlement could have been 
committed, under the government's flawed embezzlement notion, was 
when appellant failed to place the buyers' money in trust but, 
instead, put it in his own checking account over which he had 
sole control. As the chart on page 4 shows, this would not 
affect the statute of limitations argument. 
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1353 (E.D. " * aff fd r 413 P. 2d "037 (4ti '" . 1969) 
(embezzl ement depend :>:i I cli spos ' -~ ' 
paii ol. distinctly different hypothetical^ . w u s t . a e this 
principle of law. T< ike fox " example .• teller who embezzles 
I! I in in t t , l i t =!!' Ill:: sai i I II ;::' ' s t :ii ] ] • : i: i ' h e t, e I il i»»i 11 a s 
embezzled funds at that time even I f i spent one, five 
or ten years later. ndeed, the crime has been committed even if 
the teller never spends the money and returns i t to the bai ik at a 
subsequent ti me. Modifying those facts slightly, but critically, 
t h e s a ii e 1:: a i :i II ;:  t e J 3 111 m i h i i • i HI 11»«,, i • I \ < 11111111« , - 1 
continually at the rate 111 "»11)«I , 0iI a u n t n : , .>f 
$1,000.00 has been embezzled. 
case, there was • : i i E; c :)iip] eted theft , at the • t ,ime 
the teller took the $1,000.00 regardless of how, when, or whether 
1 n t he s e co n d hy po t h e 1j c a 1 , 
the teller committed a series £ thefts over a period ol, turn;;1 
Ii :i t he instant case, appellant took each buyer fs runey at 
peci f i • ::  :ii c 
The crime, i f any, was complete when each buyer parted wu:, his 
money based on the claimed false representations. Ineic xs 
absolutely no evidence at a] 1 to t he contrary. 
Cm The government failed to prove the 
offense was committed within the statute of 
limitations. 
It is well-established that criminal statutes of limitation 
are jurisdictional .  , cons11: ue• :i .1 :i 1: »ei:a 1 ] ] i i I f i i ; : i: i in: i i : f 
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the accused and strictly against the government. See, e.g. , 
Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970); State v. 
Eilts, 596 P.2d 1050 (Ct. App. Wash. 1979); Padie v. State, 557 
P.2d 1138 (Alaska 1976); People v. Zamora, 557 P.2d 75 (Cal. 
1975); State v. Fogel, 492 P.2d 742 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1972); 
Cunningham v. District Court of Tulsa County, 432 P.2d 992 (Ct. 
Crim. App. Okla. 1967) . 
Ordinarily, of course, the date of an offense is not 
essential in pleading a crime as long as prosecution has been 
brought within the statute of limitations. See State v. Bundy, 
684 P.2d 58 (Utah 1984); State v. Tacconi, 171 P.2d 388 (Utah 
1946); State v. Distefano, 262 P. 113 (Utah 1927). This is true, 
however, only when n[n]o contention is made that the statute of 
limitations may have run11. State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d at 62; State 
v. Fergusen, 558 P.2d 1092, 1095 (Kan. 1976) (time unessential 
since no statute of limitations involved). 
There is an important exception to the general rule if it 
appears from the facts that the statute of limitations may have 
run. In that case, as here, the government must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the offense was committed within the time 
permitted by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Grunewald v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 414-415; State v. Young, 440 N.E.2d 
1379, 1381 (Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton County 1981); United States 
v. Wolf, 407 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Mo. 1975); People v. Kohut, 282 
N.E.2d 312, 315 (N.Y. 1972); State v. Newton, 81 P. 1002 (Wash. 
1905) . 
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The facts
 case demonstrate that the offens* 
committed, when appellant made the misrepresentati^ 
to r..v buyers and took their money wifh the intent • exercise 
c • .LII-JL.' """ ' ' " ' " '*-"ir»l.iiieiii'. 
Prosecution was commenced under the Second Amended Information 
more ^han fotn years beyond that date and is time-barred. 
lav:- Hi I he i HI i w i ct ioi is must be reversed. 
2 # jj^ e jury verdict is ambiguous regarding the statute 
of limitations. 
11 1 a i :t a ppa r e n t a 1: t e tut f > t t • :: a v o :l d t h e s t a t u t e :: f J I m i t a t :i o in s 
bar, the government filed a "Second Amended Information" which 
added •- •*- * dates endin v with April ur .uunu. 
A. aemonstrate ;owever- +he addition ;ate ™ 
which appellant ran > bears relationship rv: *ten 
the 
is suggest that how appellant spent the money was not 
arguably relevant to his earlier intent ^^i* xt. 
S • f.111 11 I ii. i 11*»ie11"1 .. „. , , ,.owever, and 
cannot extend the statute for offense which has already been 
committed. 
Most importantly, the information, as frame ; - * a range of 
dates, included dates for which prosecution was bari^ j , -. i> 
f y 
verdict regarding when appellant riminal 
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commit the offenses, i.e., at the time he took the buyers' money 
or when he finally spent all of it. If the juryf or some of 
them, found that appellant had such intent on the first date 
alleged in each count, then the offenses would be clearly 
time-barred, Iff on the other hand, the juryf or some of them, 
found that such intent was not formed until the money was finally 
spent, then the offenses would not be time-barred. 
It is likewise possible that some, or all, of the jurors 
found appellant formed the intent to keep the buyers' money 
somewhere in between the beginning and ending dates in each 
count. It is simply impossible to tell for which, if any, of 
these alternatives the jury found appellant guilty. That is why 
the date of offense is critical in this case. 
The jury verdict in this case does not reflect when the jury 
unanimously concluded appellant committed the offenses. Indeed, 
whether they ever so concluded is in doubt. For example, count 2 
alleged that the offense was committed "on or between August 27, 
1979, and April 29, 1980". The jury may have found that the 
offense was committed on August 27, 1979, in which case 
prosecution was barred. Or, it might have found the offense was 
committed on April 29, 1980, in which case there was no evidence 
to support it. To add to the confusion created by the 
As already demonstrated, such a finding would have had no 
factual foundation because there was no evidence from which a 
jury could have possibly concluded appellant's intent to keep the 
money was not formed until after the buyers had invested. 
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"! "Jl.1 I l l i MIL Ji l l
 ( l u l l l i l l l l i l l , i l i i i y llhlV'H II I! I I I lllhll I III l i t I" Hill ! ( ' W I S 
committed on August 27 , 1979, while four others may have fo.it the 
offense was committed on April ?.9r 198U. Thus „ the jury mav have 
found appellant guilty on this count even though there was no 
unanimity on this critical element. 
• • in II imiimi Il II lo '"  i i if ) i 11111 i lliii u o i 1111 il w h o i I M J I l i e 
jury unanimously agreed that ippellant committed the offenses 
within the statute limitations, !*s verdict * ambiguous and must 
be reversed for See Grunewald v. United States, 
supra, 353 ^ .4-415 (convictions reversed where it was 
committed within statute of limitations); State v. Tacconi, I71 
P " < *«** (Utah 1946 convict eversed where insufficient 
n , 1 ni in I In in MI . s l tin I in I i n y 
period). 
ft s one wuiu L : Appeals noted: 
When one is charged with having committed a crime by 
several methods and there is a deficiency of proof as 
to one or more of those methods, the court must set 
aside the verdict unless it can ascertain that the jury 
founded its verdict upon one of the methods with regard 
to which substantial evidence has been introduced. 
State v. Carothers, 84 Wash. 2d 256f 525 2d 731 (1974). 
There is no indication that the jury returned special 
verdicts or made special findings. The jury was 
instructed that in order to convict Mr. Vandenburg it 
had to agree unanimously as to any one of the 
alternative modes by which the crime has been charged. 
The jury may properly have convicted upon the basis of 
either or both of the other alternative modes. Prom a 
general verdict, however, we cannot ascertain upon 
which alternative mode the jury agreed unanimously. 
Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment and remand 
the case for new trial. 
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State v, Vandenburg, 544 P.2d 1251 (Ct. App. Wash, 1976). Put 
differently, where evidence is defective on one of two 
alternatives for guilt in the same count, the ambiguity of the 
verdict requires reversal. See United States v. Natelli, 527 
F.2d 311, 325 (2d Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). 
In the present case, the prosecution did not proceed on 
alternative theories. In fact, the government deliberately 
abandoned prosecution for theft by deception seven days before 
trial, when it filed the new information, in order to gain the 
substantial tactical advantage of multiple charges under an 
insufficient embezzlement theory. Based on the government's 
tactics, appellant had no opportunity to, and did not, defend 
against the abandoned theft by deception alternative. 
The problem was compounded because the jury was not 
instructed that it had to agree unanimously on the date of the 
offense. For example, in jury instruction number 7 (A.R. at 
149-150) , the jury was told only that one of the essential 
elements of the crime in each count included the exercise of 
unauthorized control "on or about the respective dates stated in 
each count of the information". The instruction given did not 
address the problem presented here because it did not explain 
that, under the circumstances of this case, the jury must 
unanimously agree on when appellant committed the crime. 
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The ji 11: ] /er 1:1 :: t :I , 3 fata 1 ] y ambi guous and appellant1 s 
1 7 
convictions must be reversed, 
3# rp^ Q court erred in denying the motion for new trial 
without allowing new counsel time to prepare an 
adequate record. 
The Court held a hearing cm appellant's new tria1 ^~uAnn 
ri'a it;u cue transcr r * oresent -< '-iticnal 
and supportable basis tor new tri*. .
 f 
counsel requested additional time, under H, H I ?n«; stressed 
that iita i Ij ' of the ma11 ei:s :i i Itei :ided t : . » *'-: e 
matters outside the recordf going ; n counse >ve:all 
:i i lef f ecti veness. 
There was «o way for - e 'luuit ("" I'IOM i«e ji IM-TH-'I ' a 
the absence of adequate record. The Court's faiJurp to 
reason xz> c^eai in 
this case. There i. ,,-w nothing for this wurt- *-^  review ^ a 
meaningfi xanner because an adequate •*•--•• w naoe >n 
disposing ? ion- e 
reversed and remanded i: a i-u.l 1 idrt hearing regarding the 
et"fcj»^ i vi- it"! i1 I .MM c < " i, c o u n s e l . 
17 
While this Court could remand for a i lew trial, m ty attempt to 
retry appellant on the same facts using a different theory, i.e., 
theft by deception, raises serious double jeopardy questions. 
See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978)? Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1 (1978) • 
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This was not a case of new counsel's failure to prepare; it 
was a question of not having time to do so. The Court apparently 
believed there was nothing that trial counsel could have failed 
to do that would not fall within the realm of unassailable trial 
strategy (See N. Tr. 5) . With due respect to the trial court, 
appellant should have had a meaningful opportunity to present 
evidence outside the record concerning the ineffective assistance 
of counsel so the Court could have exercised its discretion. 
This Court could then have provided meaningful review of the 
lower court's decision. Trial counsel's effectiveness and 
preparation were particularly crucial in this case where the 
trial court itself noted that it "may have voted differently than 
the jury if [sic] were on the jury" (S. Tr. 10) . The matter 
should be remanded for a full evidentiary hearing on a motion for 
new trial with adequate time for new counsel to present evidence 
and affidavits in support of the motion. 
4. The Court erred in ordering appellant to pay a fine 
and make restitution. 
Despite being advised at sentencing that appellant could not 
repay the buyers, the Court imposed a fine on appellant and 
ordered restitution without an inquiry into his ability to pay 
(S. Tr. 6-7) . This Court has noted that fines and restitution 
are generally disfavored for defendants who lack the ability to 
pay. State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1222-1223 (1984) 
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( S t e w a r t r J c o n c u r r i rig) Se e a 1 Moore u , Uiii t od S t a t e s , 150 
E 2 :I 32 3 , 3 25 (1 Cltl C. i ] • 1 94 5) , 
In a d d i t i o n # t h e r e ai:e sevei :a 1 p r o c e d u r a l and subs ta .n11ve 
i i i f :ii r rii i t i e s :i  i i t h• B C • ::: • I I i: t ' ' s : i: • ::l• s r e c:l r e s 1 I'"' i1 rj x a rr |: 1 o , f h e 
Cour t d i d n o t make i t s r e a s o n s f o r o r d e r i n g r e s t i t u t i o n d [,ait of 
i t s - t - t ^ r . .<,*:• , - n r l i r . i t t t M * t r . f . i d e i o ^ " h e 
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 ' 1 ' F u r t h e r . *:- - e s t i t u t i o r : c idere** t.y t h t ! \ ; u r t 
r i I \ M < U»f: i n f i d i' t" : 
When a person i s adjudged guilty of criminal 
activity which has resulted in pecuniary damages, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution up to 
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has 
pleaded guilty, is convicted, or to t: .he victim of any 
other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (b) finds that restitution is 
inappropriate. If the court determines that 
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the court 
shall make the reasons for the decision a part of its 
written order, 
(b) In determining whether juier 
restitution, or restitution which is complete, partial, 
or nominal/ the court shall take into account: 
The financial resources of the defendant and 
the burden that payment of restitution will impose, 
with due regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) The afaI] ity of the defendant t;) pay 
restitution on an installment basis o:i : < : other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
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appears to contemplate restitution to alleged victims of offenses 
for which the appellant was neither charged, nor convicted, or 
admitted his guilt in clear violation of §76-3-201(3)(a). To the 
extent that the restitution order was meant to encompass such 
alleged victims, its scope is clearly invalid. 
The manner of enforcement for appellant's failure to pay the 
fine and restitution is also unclear under the court's order. 
Normally, a defendant who fails to pay a fine or make 
restitution, which he has the ability to do, may be sentenced to 
additional unspecified imprisonment for contempt of court. See 
Utah Code Ann., §76-3-201.1(2). In the instant case, the overly 
broad restitution order and the Court's failure to comply with 
the substantive and procedural provisions of the law, coupled 
with appellant's potentially indefinite imprisonment for 
contempt, collectively raise serious constitutional questions 
against imprisonment for debt. See Utah Const., Art. I §16; 
Harris v. Harris, 377 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1963). 
This Court does not need to reach these constitutional 
issues, but instead should remand the matter for a full hearing 
on whether appellant has the ability to pay the fine and 
restitution with instructions that restitution may in no event 
exceed the actual pecuniary damages of the people named in the 
information. See Utah Code Ann., §76-3-201(4)(b). 
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CONCLUSION 
•. • A p p e l l dJi I, n - ' q u e s L u I I in1" l o j l o w i n g i I i -'I.': 
1 Reversal ol his conviction 01 :i a ] ] counts because the 
evidence was insufficient for embezzlement and prosecution J.& 
time-barred for theft by deception. 
2 m :'.'f native, reversal -i i remand for trial 
a , ' . 1 iipor»iL»i I 
found appellant committed an offense wit run the statute 
limitations. 
3 Ii I the alternativef a remand for hearing on appel lant's 
motion for new trial based on the ineffective assistance cf t ial 
counsel. 
4 "" *-u- alternative, - remand for a hearing on 
appellant :!-•* *•*. - - •- •'.•*.-• and restitution as well as on 
t.M- .  , . ;.- . I. 
WHEREFORE espectfully submitted that appellant's 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3*/ day of January, 1986. 
CLYDE & PRATT 
A 1:1 i! i m 1 ; Ji I 11 mi A p p e 1 1 .ml 
^ 
j 
V 
Rodney G. Snow 
JL^JS H. M c ^ . 
Neil'-A. Kaplan 
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